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Next Steps in 
Health Reform
Abbe R. Gluck and  
Nicole Huberfeld
Introduction
The central theme of this symposium is “next steps in 
health reform.” Wherever health reform is headed, it 
will certainly draw on the structure, implementation, 
and other lessons of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA). 
 The ACA was designed with a complex amalgam 
of health care governance architectures, all of which 
have implications for American federalism in general 
and federalism in health policy specifically — both 
what federalism is and what it does. Most notably, The 
ACA’s two key policy pillars were designed with dif-
ferent structural approaches: the Medicaid expansion 
was supposed to be uniform nationwide, while the new 
health insurance exchanges were designed to give states 
the right of first refusal to lead and tailor them. What 
happened instead — as a result of political resistance 
to the statute combined with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to make the Medicaid expansion optional — has 
been a roiling experiment in modern American health 
care federalism. Here, we recount salient aspects of that 
experiment, drawing on our five-year study tracking the 
federalist and nationalist aspects of ACA implementa-
tion. Whatever the next steps in health reform may be, 
the relationship between states and the federal govern-
ment, and among the states themselves, will remain 
central issues.
Our study centered on the Medicaid expansion 
and health insurance exchanges for multiple rea-
sons: they are central pillars in the ACA’s objective of 
near-universal insurance coverage; they operate on a 
grand scale that allowed for comprehensive tracking 
and analysis; and they rely on the states both in the 
law as drafted and in its implementation. We com-
prehensively tracked implementation of those two 
policy interventions across the states from 2012-2017. 
We then confirmed our findings with interviews of 
key federal and state officials and other stakeholders 
involved in implementation.1
We found that the ACA’s implementation has been 
marked by four characteristics that have been largely 
unexplored in the general federalism literature. First, 
state choices to participate in the ACA’s implementa-
tion have been dynamic: participation in the national 
statutory scheme is not a one-time, in/out question, 
but rather, states move fluidly among structural 
options that yield different relationships with the 
federal government. Second, the federal government, 
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especially under the Obama Administration — which 
was eager to entrench the statute at any cost — has 
been markedly pragmatic about facilitating state 
implementation of the law. Third, the aforementioned 
features have produced an atmosphere of near con-
stant federal/state negotiation and interstate compe-
tition and learning. Finally, implementation has high-
lighted the importance of intrastate democracy. “The 
states” are not a monolithic bloc, although they are 
often discussed that way, even by federalism experts. 
Legal structures and political considerations unique 
to each state made each implementation experience 
different from the next. Governors operated with dif-
ferent interests than legislators, even within the same 
political party in the same state. The same is true for 
state insurance commissioners.
Together, these features of implementation allowed 
the states to exert significant power, contrary to a 
persistent narrative that the ACA produced a federal 
“takeover.” But, intriguingly, we also found that states 
gained this power almost independently of any par-
ticular structural arrangement, whether federalist 
or nationalist. In other words, it has mattered less 
for purposes of classic “federalism values” — such as 
experimentation, cooperation, autonomy, and varia-
tion — whether states operated their own exchanges 
or let the federal government run them. What has 
mattered most has been state engagement with the 
implementation of the law, regardless of the formali-
ties of its architecture. These observations give rise to 
the question of whether the values we associate with 
federalism, and expect federalist arrangements to pro-
duce, are necessarily dependent on particular statu-
tory structures. This question is particularly impor-
tant to the success of future health reform efforts.
Finally, even as we found it relatively clear that the 
ACA enhanced state power over health policy, we 
found it difficult to determine if the ACA’s reliance on 
the states actually improved health care. Part of the 
difficulty stems from societal and political disagree-
ment about first principles. Namely, deep disagree-
ment exists regarding what, if anything, we expect the 
government to achieve in health policy — Equality? 
Lower costs? Better outcomes? Nothing? The ACA 
itself reflects this tension, as it combines a universalist 
philosophy of health care for all with continued reli-
ance on private insurance markets, where people can 
get only the health care they can afford. But the first 
principles are critical for the next steps. It is impos-
sible to know whether federalism in health policy is 
worth pursuing if we do not know or cannot agree 
about what we seek from federalism or from health 
policy in the first place.
I. The ACA’s Modern Federalism:  
Our Findings
The ACA’s statutory architecture purposefully involved 
state policymaking in key features of the law. As 
drafted, the ACA had many aims, but its primary goal 
was universal health insurance coverage. To accom-
plish that goal, the law employs two key mechanisms: 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility to childless, non-
elderly adults, and creation of more robust individual 
and small group health insurance markets through 
newly-devised “exchanges.”2 
 Medicaid expansion created a national baseline of 
eligibility but relied on states for implementation, 
as Medicaid always has done. The health insurance 
exchanges were designed to be state-run, with federal 
administration as a fallback. These pillars created a 
national baseline that was meant to cover individuals 
who had been long excluded from health insurance, 
but they were also designed to put states in the driv-
er’s seat for many policy choices within that national 
baseline.
Although many call the ACA’s federal/state struc-
ture a model of “cooperative federalism,” we discov-
ered that this modern health care federalism is sig-
nificantly more complex than traditional cooperative 
federalism doctrine acknowledges. We found the 
ACA’s federalism to be dynamic, adaptive, pragmatic, 
negotiated, and robust in both horizontal and verti-
cal intergovernmental activity. States learned from 
and leveraged the successes of thought-leader states 
for gains in their own negotiations. For example, after 
Arkansas gained approval for the first demonstration 
waiver to use premium assistance to expand Medicaid 
eligibility, Iowa, Michigan, and Pennsylvania quickly 
moved to build on and “one up” Arkansas’s success-
ful negotiations, with each state gaining some simi-
lar and some different policy concessions from HHS. 
The federal government adapted each time with the 
knowledge that states were learning from one another 
and viewed each negotiation as setting the stage for 
the next state’s demands.
Federal and state officials each brought differ-
ent pragmatic goals to the bargaining table. While 
the Obama Administration took a long-term view of 
entrenching the law — and was willing to compro-
mise policy ideals to achieve that goal — state offi-
cials operated with shorter time horizons and took 
advantage of the Administration’s eagerness to lever-
age their own policy concessions. States have even 
returned to the bargaining table to seek further con-
cessions when other states win new ones. A recent 
example that post-dates our study but demonstrates 
its durability is HHS’s approval of Kentucky’s waiver 
application implementing a work requirement for the 
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expansion population, which was followed quickly by 
new waiver approvals — with slight variations — for 
Indiana, Arkansas, and New Hampshire. (The validity 
of the Kentucky waiver is currently being litigated.)3 
Although the policy goals of the Trump Administra-
tion’s HHS may be different, these dynamic negotia-
tions continue the patterns of the first five years of 
implementation of the ACA.4
These ongoing negotiations have not resulted in a 
federal/state binary but rather have produced a variety 
of state-led and federally-led models as circumstances 
warrant. Indeed, the ACA’s initial structural architec-
ture has turned out to be a mere starting point for the 
allocation of policymaking power between the federal 
government and states. Over the years, pragmatic and 
creative hybrids of national and state-level solutions 
have emerged that have allowed the states to remain 
in control but also to take advantage of the kind of 
help for which the federal government has econo-
mies of scale — such as financial, administrative, and 
technical assistance. Whereas Congress designed the 
ACA with an “either/or” vision — that is, with one or 
50 policy options in mind — the realities of imple-
mentation have revealed a sweet spot somewhere in 
the middle. For instance, while some states created 
their own exchanges, more than half used variants of 
the federal model. Several states copied the exchange 
models established in other states, in many cases 
using the same consultants, to avoid reinventing the 
wheel. As one high-ranking former federal official told 
us: “We don’t need 50 of these things, but we might 
need eight.”5
Moreover, while federalism scholars obsess over 
common values such as cooperation, disobedience, 
variety, and autonomy, we found those values nearly 
meaningless in the context of the ACA. Some states 
expanded Medicaid from the beginning, others did 
not expand at all, and others negotiated waivers that 
rode on the coattails of prior states’ successes. Which 
states were more autonomous or more cooperative? 
As another example, take the question of whether to 
operate a state-based exchange. Many states appeared 
to choose not to run their own exchanges, and a com-
mon representation of that choice is that “blue” states 
cooperated by establishing state-run exchanges and 
that “red” states rebelled by defaulting to a federally-
run exchange out of resistance to the law. This binary 
is false and seriously oversimplified. For instance, 
Oregon began with a state-based exchange but then 
switched to the federal exchange due to technical dif-
ficulties.6 As a result, Oregon’s exchange was struc-
turally the same as Texas’s. Did Oregon become more 
“uncooperative,” “sovereign,” or “autonomous” when 
it gave up on its state-based exchange and used the 
federal exchange? Was it as uncooperative, sovereign, 
or autonomous as Texas? Surely federalism has to be 
more than a question of attitude.
On the other side, and perhaps coun-
terintuitively given repeated warnings of 
a federal takeover, we found that states 
exerted real sovereign power when they 
implemented the ACA themselves — they 
were not simply acting as administrators. 
States enacted hundreds of state laws, 
enacted new state governance structures, 
and controlled swaths of health policy 
due to their inclusion in the ACA’s statu-
tory architecture. The alternative — leav-
ing states out of implementation entirely — would 
have given states no role in health policy whatsoever. 
It also would have done nothing to preserve the rel-
evance of the state sovereign lawmaking apparatus — 
the role of state law and state regulation — as ACA 
implementation has done. Ironically, the states that 
suffered the greatest power losses are the ones that 
have refused to engage with implementation at all and 
so invited the federal government to take over their 
small group and nongroup insurance markets.
 But to be clear, not every state that defaulted to a 
national exchange opened the door to a federal take-
over. We found that some red states, eager to main-
tain policy control but needing political cover, worked 
behind the scenes with the federal government, taking 
advantage of the Obama Administration’s eagerness 
to help, even as these states publically appeared to 
resist. The ACA was entrenched by these efforts, and 
states exerted the policy control they desired, but at 
the expense of political accountability and transpar-
ency. One official colorfully labeled this the “secret 
boyfriend model” of state-national relations: a rela-
tionship coveted by the states, but one that states were 
unwilling to admit publically for political reasons.7
 Finally, intrastate governance has been a key fea-
ture of the ACA’s federalism. Each state is an individ-
ual republic, so states’ unique internal structures have 
shaped their ACA-related decisions. For instance, 
some states had preexisting insurance regulations that 
While federalism scholars obsess over 
common values such as cooperation, 
disobedience, variety, and autonomy, we 
found those values nearly meaningless in the 
context of the ACA. 
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affected the design of their exchanges as well as laws 
implementing Medicaid that influenced their negotia-
tions over expanding eligibility. State officials also dif-
fer from one another, even within the same state. Gov-
ernors — dealing with a longer time horizon and more 
direct accountability to the variety of stakeholders in 
their states — bucked legislators in their own parties 
to take advantage of the ACA’s benefits. Insurance 
commissioners worked with HHS to maintain policy 
control, even as their own states’ governors and legis-
lators wished to rebel. These distinctions underscore 
the diverse priorities of different members of state 
government and the different structures of the state 
governments themselves. These internal state dynam-
ics have had a profound influence on national policy 
implementation and have been largely overlooked in 
the federalism literature.
II. Implications for Federalism and for 
Health Policy
Our study deconstructs federalism’s commonly 
named attributes, including sovereignty, autonomy, 
cooperation, and variety, and illustrates that many 
common federalism questions are oversimplified, and 
perhaps unanswerable, in the context of a modern 
statutory scheme such as the ACA. More specifically, 
the study challenges the idea that any particular gov-
ernance arrangement will be the exclusive producer 
of any particular set of policy values, including the 
values traditionally associated with “federalism.” As 
one example, we saw as much policy variation and 
experimentation within nationally-run exchanges as 
across state-run exchanges.
Whether the ACA’s structural architecture and 
dependence on the states actually serve health pol-
icy is a harder question. Indeed, it is not even clear 
whether the statute’s structural architecture was sup-
posed to serve health policy in the first place, or to 
serve political expediency, or the structural end of fed-
eralism for federalism’s own sake. In other words, we 
must interrogate whether federalism is an end in itself 
or a means to an end in health care.
In part, this opacity can be attributed to the fact that 
the core goals of the American health care system have 
never been established through widespread political 
or social agreement. Do we all deserve access to health 
care or do we only get the health care we can afford? 
This fundamental normative question about the role 
of the government in health policy has remained unan-
swered through each effort at health reform from the 
Nation’s founding. The Congress that enacted the ACA, 
although it moved the needle significantly toward the 
idea of universal coverage, was likewise unwilling to go 
all the way toward a unified, fully national program and 
retained important aspects of existing private markets. 
It is likely that, politically, this incremental approach 
was the only way to enact major health reform at the 
time. But there is little indication that the specific gov-
ernance structures used were the result of evidence-
based health policy choices.
In the end, our data were clearer about the effect 
of the ACA’s governance structure on enhancing state 
power in health care than about whether the ACA’s 
reliance on state implementation positively affected 
common metrics of good health policy, such as cost, 
access, and quality. For example, the ACA’s Medic-
aid expansion as drafted by Congress — which man-
dated uniform eligibility expansion — was national-
ist in structure and would have increased access to 
care more efficiently than the current, more federal-
ist, structure has done (created when the Supreme 
Court in NFIB gave states a choice), simply by cov-
ering millions more lives. In the exchange realm, the 
The harder question is whether the dynamic, pragmatic, negotiated, and 
intrastate politics of the modern health care federalism we observed actually 
serve health policy well. That question points to two major needs for the field, 
one theoretical and one empirical. First, we must do the hard work of settling 
on goals for the American health care system, so we know what to aim for 
in future efforts to improve it. Second, we need rigorous empirical study of 
various policy architectures in statutory implementation to determine which 
structural arrangements best accomplish the aims we establish. Only then 
will we know whether health care federalism, nationalism, or something in 
between should be the goal of the next effort at health reform.
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data is unclear as to whether states that ran their own 
exchange did better in terms of costs, broad networks, 
or quality than the national exchanges.
Looking forward, as this article went to press, calls 
for “single-payer” health reform — a uniform national 
insurance coverage plan — were on the rise and for 
the first time were gaining political traction. Should 
the conversation seriously turn to this structural ques-
tion, the federalism implications of our ACA study 
have important lessons. First, we have seen how, even 
within a national governance structure, states can 
exert enormous power and produce great variety if the 
statute is designed to allow it. Thus, one question is 
whether moves toward more nationalist health reform 
delivery should put states on the front lines as the ACA 
did. Again, it depends on the goals. State participation 
can increase variability or not; it depends on statutory 
design. At the same time, we also saw a federal gov-
ernment that consistently seems to prefer the states’ 
help to implement health reform; it does not appear 
to want to go it alone. Given these practical consid-
erations, and the entrenched state bureaucracies and 
expertise in health care, it may be very difficult to 
eliminate the state role entirely. Nor are we certain it 
would be wise to do so without empirical examination 
of when state leadership in health policy produces the 
best results. One major takeaway of our study is that 
path-dependent health reform should stop. The next 
major effort must involve a conversation about desired 
outcomes, implementation capacity, and reforms 
grounded in governance structures that have proved 
successful in producing results.
Conclusion
Our study underscores how the concept of federalism 
tends to be a proxy for a variety of goals and ideas 
in health care and beyond. Federalism sometimes 
is advanced as an end in itself, aimed at generating 
structural and democratic benefits believed to derive 
from multiple layers of government. But federalism 
also is a means to an end when it is used by Congress 
for improving policy; here, that end is good health 
policy. If one takes as true, as we do, that modern fed-
eralist arrangements often no longer come from sepa-
rate spheres of power, but rather tend to come from 
state participation in federal law and not exclusion 
from it, our study reveals that states are quite good 
at leveraging their authority within national statutory 
architectures — especially when the federal govern-
ment cares deeply about achieving the goals central 
to a law’s implementation.
The harder question is whether the dynamic, prag-
matic, negotiated, and intrastate politics of the mod-
ern health care federalism we observed actually serve 
health policy well. That question points to two major 
needs for the field, one theoretical and one empirical. 
First, we must do the hard work of settling on goals for 
the American health care system, so we know what to 
aim for in future efforts to improve it. Second, we need 
rigorous empirical study of various policy architec-
tures in statutory implementation to determine which 
structural arrangements best accomplish the aims 
we establish. Only then will we know whether health 
care federalism, nationalism, or something in between 
should be the goal of the next effort at health reform.
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